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The  1973-74  Arab  oil  embargo  and  the  sudden  jolt  in the  price
of imported  crude  oil hit Americans  like the onset of the flu. Wildly
contagious,  this acute  disorder  hampered  the mobility  of many  and
stirred  up  confusion  and  disbelief  throughout the nation.  Although
many  public  officials  advised  that  we  were  experiencing  the begin-
ning of a chronic  affliction,  a large proportion of the population did
not share this diagnosis.
In  the  spring  of  1979  a  second  blow  to  the  gas  tank rekindled
national  tensions,  reduced output, increased unemployment,  and led
to justifiable  panic cries for fuel. In such periods not only were truck
movements  curtailed,  but  a  large  portion  of  carrier  productive
resources  were  directed  toward  coping  with  the  chaotic  situation.
These  recent  episodes  serve  as  lessons  for  policymakers.  They
clearly  showed  that  a  pressing  public  concern  did  exist.  We  didn't
have  the  facts  and  in  their  absence  suspicions  filled  the void.  Most
of us could accept shortages a lot better if we understood  why.
The  $100  billion  American  trucking  industry  uses  approximately
20  billion  gallons  of  fuel  annually.  This  paper  seeks  to  clarify  the
motor freight  industry's  vulnerability  to uncertain  fuel supplies, and
to  examine  several  strategies  for  dealing  with  a smaller  fuel supply
and higher real prices for fuel.
Vulnerability to an Uncertain Fuel Supply and Rising Prices
The  motor  carrier  is  as  vulnerable  to fuel  supply  interruptions  as
the farmer  is at planting  or harvest time. The trucker and the farmer
simply  have  no acceptable  alternative to internal combusion engines.
In order  to meet  the essential  societal  needs  we  have  had to turn to
hastily  conceived  fuel  allocation  plans drawn up by federal and state
agencies.
43An  example  of  the  misguided  attempt  to  patch  the  fuel  system
can  be  seen  in the May  1979  issuance of Special  Rule  No.  9.1  Under
this  order,  the  Department  of  Energy  allocated  diesel  fuel to  agri-
cultural  production  at 100  percent  of current  need.  Production  was
not defined  to include  distribution.  Farmers  were  allowed the diesel
fuel  they  needed  to  produce  food,  while  other  essential  fuel  users,
e.g.,  railroads  and  motor  carriers,  were  completely  ignored.  Subse-
quently,  the  DOE  amended  the order  to  include  the distribution  of
perishables  by  truck.  But  DOE  so  narrowly  defined  distribution  as
to  be  almost  useless.  Trucks  had  to  have  the  cargo  already loaded.
These  same  amendments  expanded  the  100  percent  allocation
level  to  other  categories,  including  the  exploration  and  production
of oil  and natural gas. Again DOE excluded distribution. Apparently,
the  rationale  was  that  gasoline  and  fuel  oil could  be produced,  but
not  distributed  to  the  216,000  service  stations  and  other  retail
outlets.  Neither federal nor state fuel allocation bodies have provided
for the rational, systematic handling of fuel shortages.
One  basic  misrepresentation  made  by  DOE  is  their  data  that
trucks  consume  24 percent  of all  petroleum.2 All  vehicles registered
as  trucks,  ranging  from  farm  pickups  and  recreational  vehicles  to
tractor-trailer  combinations  were  included  in the definition.  A more
useful  representation  is to  separate trucks  used  as passenger  vehicles
from those  used  to  carry  freight.  Heavy  duty  freight-carrying  com-
bination  vehicles  use  about  4  percent  of  all  petroleum  products.3
Another  dilemma  is  the  vulnerability  to  increases  in  fuel  prices.
The  average truckstop  price of  30 cents per gallon for diesel in  1973
doubled  to  60  cents in  1978.  As  of July  1,  1980, the average  price
for  this  fuel,  based  on  407  reporting  truckstops,  was  $1.137  per
gallon.  Future  increases  will  largely  reflect OPEC  pricing decisions
and efforts  by the federal  government to bring the price of domestic
crude oil up to world prices.
What  is the  impact  of $1.13  per gallon  to a long-haul  truck oper-
ator?  Today, a typical  two-man  driving team, running 131,000 miles
per year,  will spend approximately  $33,400 for fuel. That's over one-
fourth  the  estimated  total  costs,  excluding drivers.  A  realistic  total
cost per mile, including 28.8 cents per mile for the drivers, is approx-
imately  $1.  In  order to yield  a year-end  return  on an  investment  of
say,  18  percent, a  charge of  at least  $1.13 per loaded mile would be
necessary.  Certainly the percentage of fuel costs to revenue is not the
same for all  carriers.
1DOE.  "Special  Rule  No.  9  of Part  211.  Petroleum  Allocation  Regulations."  Adopted
May 15,  1979.
2DOE.  "End  Use  Energy  Consumption  Data  Base Series/Tables."  Energy Information,
June  1978.
3DOE.  Data  derived  from  Transportation Energy  Conservation Data Book.  Oakridge
National Laboratory.  1979, p.  215.
4Household Goods Carriers' Bureau. Comparative Fuel Price Report. July  1,  1980.
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As  fuel  prices  rise  and  supplies  tighten,  the  incentive  to  act  is
increased.  Our  industry  has  become  a  firm  believer  in  voluntary
conservation  methods.  Since  1976,  the  Voluntary  Truck  and  Bus
Fuel  Economy  Program,  a  cooperative  effort  of  truck  builders,
users,  and  government, has achieved  impressive  fuel  savings amount-
ing to  more  than four billion  gallons.  That's  enough  to heat  all  the
homes in Boston, Pittsburgh, Minneapolis, and Columbus, Ohio for one
year. Presently, the  voluntary approach  is believed  to be responsible
for saving some 4.2 million gallons of fuel  a day.
These  impressive  savings  stem  largely  from the rapid adoption  of
more  efficient  diesel  engines,  radial  tires,  and  various aerodynamic
devices to reduce  drag.  Additional  common  sense  practices designed
to  conserve  fuel  are:  reducing road  speeds,  teaching  fuel  conserving
driving  skills,  improving  maintenance  procedures,  better  routing
and  scheduling,  and adding new fuel-saving  devices  on older trucks.
Whether  these  conservation  efforts  will  be  sufficient  to  assure  an
adequate supply of fuel for motor carriers  is debatable.
At  the present  time, the fuel situation is like taking your hand out
of  a  vise:  the  pressure  is  off,  but  you  are  still  hurting.  Supplies
appear  quite  adequate  but prices  keep hurting us in the pocketbook.
The DOT reported  that during the first five months of 1980 gasoline
usage  in the  U.S. has declined  to its lowest  level  since  1971. That is
the  good  news!  The  bad  news  is  our  oil  bill  is  still  equivalent  to
sending  $10.6  million  abroad  every  hour.  Currently,  the  OPEC
cartel  appears  to  be adjusting  oil output to market demand  so  that
prices  can  be  increased  automatically  under  some  sort  of inflation
index.
The Motor Carrier  Act of 1980
Someone  said  an adequate  set  of tensions  will  bring forth  intelli-
gent  responses  and lead  to the achievement  of progress.  It is fair to
say  a  superabundance  of  tensions  confronted  the  ATA  and  our
industry  leadership  on  the issue  of  continued  economic  regulation
of interstate motor carriers.
Some  other  time  I  would  like  to  expand  on  the  tensions,  the
responses,  and  the resources  that were directed  to the first compre-
hensive  legislation  dealing  with the  motor  carrier industry  since  its
economic  regulation  by  the  Interstate  Commerce  Commission  in
1935.  Time  will  tell  whether  or  not  progress  was  achieved  by  the
enactment  of  the  Motor  Carrier  Regulatory  Reform  Act of  1980,
signed July 1,  by President Carter.
The  Congressional  intent  was to reduce governmental interference
with the business  decisions  of trucking companies.  Easier entry, rate
flexibility,  and  several  provisions  designed to  partially correct  speci-
fic  energy  problems  were  major regulatory reforms  incorporated  in
the new law.
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empty  backhauls  by  owner-operators  who  transport  exempt  agri-
cultural  commodities.  To  avoid  empty  return  mileages,  these truck
operators typically lease their equipment and themselves to regulated
carriers  with  operating  authority  to  transport  regulated  products
such  as  processed  foods  back  to  the  farming  area.  Other  options
include  hauling  exempt  commodities  in  both  directions,  and  ac-
quiring ICC operating authority to haul freight that is regulated.
The new  law expands  the list of exempt agricultural  commodities
and  establishes  a procedure  whereby  an owner-operator  can  obtain,
upon a  showing of fitness and ability to comply with the law and the
ICC's  regulations,  a  permit  to  haul  processed  food,  agricultural
limestone,  and  fertilizer.  Such  persons  operating  under  the  new
permit  need  only  certify  annually  to  the  commission  that  such
transportation  does  not  exceed,  by  tonnage,  the  transportation  of
exempt  commodities.  These  provisions  are  supposed  to  reduce
empty  miles  and  produce  fuel  efficiencies  within  the motor carrier
industry.
Private  carriers  have  also  been  granted  new  opportunities  to
reduce  their  empty  miles.  The  federal  regulations  had  prohibited
intercorporate  hauling,  that is,  the transportation  for compensation,
by  one  member  of  a  corporate  family  for  another  member  in  the
absence  of  ICC  authority.  Now,  compensated  intercorporate  truck-
ing  is  permitted  so  long  as  the  parent  company  owns  100  percent
interest  in the  companies  for which  the transportation  is performed.
In  theory,  fuel  savings  are  to result  by  allowing  company  trucks to
return home with freight instead of empty.
Will  important  fuel  savings  be  realized  within  the  motor  carrier
system  as  a  direct  result  of  the  new  backhaul  allowances?  In  my
opinion,  as  new entrants and existing motor carriers  strive to  balance
their  freight  flows,  the  available  traffic  will  be redistributed  among
more  trucks,  travelling  more  total  miles.  Effectively,  greater  fuel
savings will not be achieved  within the total system.
Price Controls, Allocations, and Conservation  Plans
Unlike  the  successful  voluntary  actions  previously  discussed,
gasoline  prices  and  allocation  regulations  represent  energy  policy
nightmares  for the motor  carrier  industry.  Price controls on gasoline
distort  the  market  mechanism  by  limiting  the  price  that end  users
pay  for  fuel.  Since  motor  carriers  buy  gasoline  and  diesel  fuel
through  one  or more  supply  channels,  e.g., bulk, retail, spot market,
there  is  more  than one  selling price.  These price differentials  and the
resultant  cost  changes  of  carriers  engaged  in  different  types  of
business  artificially  impact  on  competition  and  the  market  shares
held  by  carrier  firms.  If  prices  are  binding,  they  favor  purchases
through  channels that are not price constrained.
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each  end  user  with  access  to  each  allocated  product  in proportion
to  its  historical  use.  The  first  test  of  allocation,  during  the  Arab
embargo,  forced  gasoline  suppliers  in  1974  to  supply  their  1972
customers  at  prices  based  on  those  charged  in  1973.  Equitable
allocation to end users was impossible and bringing order to a chaotic
market was not achieved - only enormous confusion.
Subsequent  governmental  "quick  fixes"  to  gasoline  allocations
in  1979  resulted  in  too  much  fuel  being  supplied  to  slow-growing
regions  while  too little was  made  available  to rapidly  growing  areas.
By  holding  prices  below  market  clearing  levels,  price  controls  made
gas  lines  inevitable  and  effectively  drove  many  marketers  out  of
business  to  more  enjoyable  jobs.  What's  more,  the interstate  move-
ments  of  perishables  were  substantially  slowed  down,  the  move-
ment  of  household  goods  practically  stopped,  meat  packing  plants
shut  down,  and  some  milk  was  dumped.  The  consequences  of rigid
controls  point  up  the  fragile  balance  of the logistical  system in the
United  States.
Regulations  of diesel  fuel present  a special  problem  since  middle
distillates  can  be  used  to  power  trucks,  locomotives,  stationary
engines,  and  oil  burners  in  the  home,  factory  or  university.  The
major  unresolved  issue  is  how to  apportion an interchangeable  fuel
among  transport  and  non-transport  users. Without  the development
of  a  national  furnace  registration  file  and  a  diesel  truck  file,  and
countless  other  files  it  is  doubtful  that  diesel  fuel  regulations  will
ever be developed.
The  Emergency  Energy  Conservation  Act  of  1979  calls  for  the
development  of  a  standby  gasoline  rationing  plan  and  a  standby
federal  emergency  conservation  plan.  While  the  trucking  industry
would  not  receive  all  the  gasoline  needed  in  a  declared  national
emergency,  two  mechanisms  would  allow  carriers  to  secure  addi-
tional gasoline  supplies.
First,  supplemental  allotments  are  obtainable  on  the  basis  of
historical  consumption,  rather  than  gross  vehicle  weight.  Each
business  firm  is  required  to register  and  identify  its historical  usage
to  DOE  during  a  pre-implementation  period.  The  second  part  pro-
vides  for ration  coupons  that could  be freely  bought  and  sold,  i.e.,
a  white  market  for  coupons.  The  standby  gasoline  rationing  plan,
effective  July  30,  1980,  is  now  in  the pre-implementation  stage and
will  remain  in standby  status until  a determination  of need  is  made
by the President.
The  Emergency  Energy  Conservation  Act  also  called  for  the
development  of  a  standby  conservation  plan.  The  federal  plan
requires  each  state  to  draw  up  an  acceptable  emergency  strategy.
Among the options under consideration  are:
471.  Odd-even motor fuel purchases;
2. Employer  programs - to reduce  work-related  commuter
travel  of employees;
3. Speed limit enforcement;
4. Compressed  workweek; and
5.  Vehicle  use  stickers  - to forego  the use  of all  vehicles
between  one  and  three  days  with specific  exemptions.
In  each instance, the proposed rules will place an undue burden on
interstate  commerce  in  contravention  of the expressed  provision  of
the EECA of 1979.
Less Restrictive Vehicle Size and Weight Regulations
There  is  at  least  one  more  significant  industry  concern  that  di-
rectly  affects  efficiency,  productivity,  and  savings  in  fuel.  Although
the  Federal-Aid  Highway  Act of 1974 specifies axle and gross weight
limits  for  trucks  using  the  Interstate  Highway  system,  each  state
retains  authority  to  adopt  weight  and  length  limits independently.
The  present  hodge-podge  of  non-uniform  state  regulations  has
handicapped  the  industry  especially  with  the  recent  upward  ratch-
eting  of  fuel  prices.  As  of July  1980,  six  remaining states  have not
authorized  the less restrictive  federal  weight  levels  on  the Interstate
System.
Recognizing  the  importance  of  these  factors,  the  Congress  is
presently  considering  legislation  to  mandate  uniform  standards  of
weight  and  length  for  these  roads.  Cargo  handling  costs  and  cir-
cuitous  routings  could  be  reduced  markedly  for  cross-country
haulers  if the industry  were  able  to operate  with  at least the 80,000
pound limits and 60 feet for tractor semitrailers in all states.
In  testimony  submitted  before  the  Connecticut  legislature  last
year,  a  major  paper company  said  that 80,000  pounds  gross  weight
would  translate  into  512 fewer  trucks on  the highways  of that state
and  the  company  would  realize  fuel  savings  of  64,737  gallons  as
compared  to the  73,280 pound  limit.  As  a matter  of public  record,
the  interstate  system  has  been  designed  and  built  to  engineering
standards above 80,000 pounds.
The  adoption  of  federal  regulations  permitting  the  nationwide
use  of  65  feet  for  other  combinations  would  generate  productivity
improvements  through  better utilization  of modern  freight  carrying
equipment.  At  present,  18  states  do  not  permit  twin  trailers.  In
many  instances,  additional  transportation  flexibility  could  be made
available  to farmers  by  dispatching  a  27-foot trailer to the farm and
then  connecting  it  with  a unit of similar  size  at an  appropriate  site
near  a major highway.  As  a practical matter, many more rural roads,
bridges, and farm lanes can accommodate  a 27-foot vehicle configura-
tion as opposed to the largest size tractor semitrailer unit.
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interstate  and  the  federal-aid  primary  system  would  also  improve
fuel  efficiency  of  the  vast  number  of  carriers  who  haul  cargo  of
low  density.  We  estimate  that about 20  percent  less diesel fuel and
30  percent  fewer  truck  trips  would  be  needed  as  compared  to the
same  freight  carried  by conventional  methods. Consolidated  Freight-
ways,  for example,  has estimated  that the use of doubles nationwide
would  save  about  3.6 million  gallons  of fuel for its company  alone.
The  American  Trucking  Association,  plus  farm  and  industry
organizations,  have  been  pressing  for greater  uniformity  in highway
regulations  related  to  vehicular  use  as  well  as  those  related  to  the
highway  system  itself.  Essential  segments  of  the  highway  system
have reached their designed service  life.
Capital  investments  are  needed  to  reconstruct  or  rehabilitate
those  segments  although  maintenance  projects  are  also  languishing
for  a  variety  of  reasons.  Runaway  inflation  makes  it  almost  im-
possible  to  project  the  costs  of  potential  improvements.  Jurisdic-
tional  hassles  and  other  national  priorities  compound the problem.
The  result  of  deferred  highway  programs,  i.e.,  less  mobility  and
more  circuity,  adversely  'affects  farm  and  recreational  income.
More  research  is  needed  on  the  federal  role  in financing  highways,
the  determination  of user  costs,  and  how  these  costs  should  then
be recovered.
My  final  comment  concerns the matter of relative  fuel  efficiency
among  competing modes  of transport.  It is true that barges are more
fuel  efficient than railroads  or that rails are  more  fuel efficient than
motor  carriers?  While  simplistic  ratio  comparisons  make  for  great
advertisements, the facts do not support the assertions.
The  claim  of  modal  fuel  economy  superiority,  based  on  the
simple  BTU  per ton-mile  calculation,  is  meaningless  because  energy
use  varies  greatly  among  circumstances  and  any  particular  mode  is
rarely  more  energy  efficient in  all cases. Many service factors such as
shipment  size,  speed  and  shipper/receiver  convenience  must  be
recognized  when  evaluating  relative  fuel  efficiency  of  the  various
modes.
In  my  view,  operating  cost  increases  may  eventually  redeploy
equipment  to  areas  where  the  cost  increase  will  be  less  strongly
felt.  In  the case  of rising  fuel  costs, the  expected response  by some
motor carriers  will  be to decrease  truck usage on very long hauls and
redeploy  the  available  capacity  to  shorter  movements.  Since  short
hauls  can  be completed  more  promptly  than long ones  a truck fleet
reassigned  to  serve  short hauls  could  carry  more  tons than before.
The  likely  reaction  by  the railroads  would  be  the  opposite,  i.e.,  a
gain  in some very long traffic  and a further loss of short haul revenue
traffic.
49Admittedly,  this  scenario  is  a long term,  evolutionary  possibility.
In  the  short  run a major  intermodal  shift of traffic is not likely.  The
point  is,  all  transportation  modes  have  a  big job  to  do and  claims
of  which  mode  is  more  fuel  efficient  are,  in  my  view,  counter-
productive.
Summary and Conclusions
The  trucking  industry  has  survived  the  present  energy  dilemma
although  perceptions  of  insecurity  are  higher  and  more  disturbing
than  ever.  With  fuel  costs  continuing  to  rise  at  a rate  faster  than
other  costs  it  is  clear  that business  decisions  will  be more  and  more
energy related.
Most  carriers  believe  they  can  handle  long-term  gradual  reduc-
tions  in  fuel  supplies  through  conservation.  They  also  believe  they
can  adjust  to  increasing  fuel  prices.  What they cannot handle are the
irrational  actions  of  governmental  "quick  fixes."  No  petroleum
product  can  be  controlled  for  one  group  of  end  users  and  decon-
trolled for another.
Productivity  improvement  projects  are  receiving  greater  empha-
sis  as motor carriers  struggle  to mitigate  the  adverse  effects  of infla-
tion  and  a  sluggish  economy.  We  should  not  assume  that  motor
carriers  will  continue  to  satisfy  all  of the  changing  demands  placed
upon them in the absence of rational, equitable energy policies.
The most valuable potential improvement  in motor freight produc-
tivity  is  for  the  remaining  states  to  modernize  their truck size  and
weight  standards  and to permit the use of twin trailers. Furthermore,
such  permissible  standards  should  in  no  way  limit  the  states  that
have historically allowed higher limits.
Twenty  years  from  today,  transportation  people  still  will  be
struggling  with  the availability  and  affordability  of energy.  Since we
can't  pull  rabbits out of a hat as  a magician  does,  or feed the multi-
tude  with  a  few  loaves  of  bread  and  fishes  as  the  Master  did,  we
are  forced  to  think  a  lot  harder,  manage  our businesses  more  care-
fully than ever, and probably  incur greater risks.
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